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ODIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND THE RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTION QUESTION
Laura S. Underkuffler*
INTRODUCTION
Employment Division v. Smith' attempts to reconcile the federal
constitutional guarantee of free religious exercise with the collective
interests of civil society-one of the most difficult problems in First
Amendment jurisprudence.
In Smith, the Supreme Court aimed to eliminate the claim that
religious believers are exempt, as a federal constitutional matter, from
otherwise neutral and generally applicable secular laws. 2 However, this
decision has not rested easily. Religious individuals continue to
challenge its central premise, and politicians continue to implement
their objections through a myriad of religious exemptions enacted as a
part of federal and state laws. 3 The Supreme Court might have held that
the Constitution does not require religious exemptions; but, it is argued,
there is nothing to stop federal or state lawmakers-of their own
volition-from enacting them.
In this Essay, I will not attempt to canvass the complex case for or
against the ultimate supremacy of secular or religious power. Suffice it
to say that in prior writings I have argued-and continue to believe-
that the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution has real meaning, and
guarantees some genuine, if limited, sphere for the exercise of religious
conscience apart from the mandate of secular law.4 What I will address
here is the question of religious exemptions in a particular category of
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 See id. at 878.
3 See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious
Freedom, 5 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 274, 287 (2010).
4 See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, Individual Conscience and the Law, 42 DEPAUL L. REV.
93 (1992); Laura S. Underkuffler, Public Funding for Religious Schools: Difficulties and
Dangers in a Pluralistic Society, 27 OXFORD REV. EDUC. 577, 584-88 (2001); Laura S.
Underkuffler, The Price of Vouchers for Religious Freedom, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 463,
476-77 (2001); Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A
Foundational Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 962-68
(1995).
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cases: that is, cases that involve what I call "odious" discrimination-
discrimination against individuals on the basis of their immutable
human characteristics in a way that secular law forbids.
"Odious" discrimination has-as its most powerful component-
not what the person in question does, but who the person in question is.
It is discrimination that is rooted in the color of a person's skin, or the
parents from whom an individual was born, or the sexual anatomy that a
person possesses (or does not possess), or the fact that an individual is
constitutively attracted to members of the same gender. It is
discrimination that is based on personal identity, or other immutable or
biological characteristics.
Claimed religious exemptions, which would permit an individual
or organization to engage in odious discrimination, can arise in many
settings. For instance, in the employment arena, religious exemptions
might be claimed by an employer who wishes to engage in race,
religion, gender, or sexual orientation discrimination in hiring or work
rules. Public or private sector employees, on the other hand, might
claim that they cannot be forced to deal with or serve particular
customers or co-employees on religious grounds.5 Landlords might
claim that they are exempt from fair housing laws and should not be
forced to rent to certain identified groups for religious reasons.
Organizations or individuals who own businesses, or sponsor other
public accommodations, might claim a religiously based right to refuse
to serve members of particular human groups. 6
Before I proceed, several observations are in order. First, I will
deal here only with that odious, identity-based discrimination that the
law, on either the state or federal level, currently prohibits. This
includes discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, sexual orientation, and transgender status. Obviously, the
list of odious, identity-based discrimination might go far beyond the list
currently recognized by legislatures and courts. However, in this Essay,
I am not addressing those hypothetical issues. Rather, I am considering
only those identity-based characteristics that democratic government
(legislatures and/or courts) has established as the legal and ethical
baseline for the current functioning of this society. To put it another
5 See, e.g., Ladele v. Islington [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1357 (Eng.), available at
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/1357.html (involving a claim by a Christian
marriage registrar, in England, that she was exempt from registration of a same-sex civil
partnership on religious grounds).
6 See, e.g., Elane Photography v. Willock, No. D-202-CV-200806632 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist.
Ct. Dec. 16, 2009) (involving the refusal of a commercial photographer to serve a same-sex
couple on religious grounds); Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No. PN34XB-
03008 (N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/
oag/newsreleases08/pr20081229a-Bernstein-v-OGCMA.pdf (involving the refusal of a Methodist
organization to rent a boardwalk pavilion, otherwise open to the public, to a same-sex couple, on
religious grounds).
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way, when considering religious exemptions and discrimination law,
one must have some notion of what discrimination is; in this Essay, I
will assume that it is what the law prohibits.
In addition, the context in which I will consider these questions
must be kept in mind. Anti-discrimination laws, by their very nature,
deal with public attitudes and public acts. An individual can consider
Asians or women or transgendered persons to be inferior-indeed,
despicable-in the privacy of his own home or in the privacy of his own
religious or secular thoughts. It is only when those attitudes are
manifest in public spaces that the state can intrude.7 Even then, the
public acts that are the subject of legal prohibitions are limited. Anti-
discrimination prohibitions regarding individual conduct typically
involve the rental or sale of housing, the hiring of employees, the
provision of public accommodations, and the performance of
governmental or other public services by individual employees.8 In
addition, if public money is accepted, anti-discrimination rules may be
dispensed with it.9 But outside of these particularly enumerated
settings, odious discrimination is a matter of personal prerogative and
choice.
Finally, I will not deal with the particular case of the rights of
religious groups and institutions to engage in discrimination as a part of
their private religious practice. Religious groups, under prevailing legal
norms, are generally exempt from laws that actually burden private
religious practice. This includes constitutional and statutory exemptions
from secular interference in the selection of clergy, the content and
performance of rituals, and the resolution of internal doctrinal, property,
and organizational disputes.10  These constitutional exemptions are
7 For an excellent discussion of the public/private dichotomy and its emerging rationale, see
Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 3, at 280-81.
8 See, e.g., Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5 (West, Westlaw through
L. 2011, c. 36, 38 & J.R. No. 2) (providing that "private" facilities or activities have no obligation
to comply with anti-discrimination rules, but "places of public accommodation" are bound, and
may discriminate only for "good" (i.e., non-discriminatory) reasons). Federal constitutional law
might also provide protection for what is deemed to be "private" conduct, despite state laws. See
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (holding that organization's First Amendment
right to expressive association precluded application of state's public accommodations law).
9 See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2986 n.13 (2010); Rumsfeld
v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 59-60 (2006).
10 See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976) (stating
that civil courts must defer to church tribunals on matters of purely ecclesiastical concern);
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)
(stating, in the context of a church property dispute, that religious organizations are entitled to "a
spirit of freedom[,] ... an independence from secular control and manipulation. . ., [a] power to
decide for themselves . .. matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine").
Statutory exemptions for religious organizations also exist. For an extensive discussion of the
constitutional and statutory exemptions available to religious organizations, see Laura S.
Underkuffler, "Discrimination" on the Basis of Religion: An Examination ofAttempted Value
Neutrality in Employment, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 581, 594-99 (1989).
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based on the belief that secular courts simply cannot interfere with these
matters; it is a question of both secular court competence and the
disentanglement of religion and state." Similar statutory exemptions
for religious organizations also exist.12
Thus, the question that this Essay will address is this: In those
cases in which particular identity-based discrimination (on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, or gender
identity) is prohibited by law, should religious exemptions be permitted
to override those laws? Should we, in other words, sanction religiously
based, odious discrimination?
It is my contention that odious discrimination is in a different class;
and that it is not, and should not be, subject to claimed religious
exemption.
I. THE TALE OF RACE
In the case of race, the answer to the exemption question is clear.
Odious discrimination on the basis of race will not be tolerated. If it is
prohibited in any sphere of civil law, religious claims for exemption
will not alter that outcome.
To some extent, this result is mandated by the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution. In a series of cases in recent
years, the Supreme Court has reiterated that racial discrimination by
government will not be tolerated and that claimed religious
justifications for racial discrimination by public officials will be of no
effect. Perhaps most well known is the case of Loving v. Virginia,13
decided by the Court in 1967. At issue in Loving was a Virginia anti-
miscegenation statute that prohibited a "white person" from marrying
any person other than another "white person."l4 The statute, derived
from the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, was challenged by a white man
11 See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713; Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 107-08
(1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1872).
12 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (religiously
affiliated universities not prohibited from engaging in religiously discriminatory admissions
practices); id § 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (providing that "a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society" may employ persons of a particular religion for the
performance of work "connected with the carrying on by such [organization] ... of its
activities"); id. § 703(e)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (an employer may employ persons of a
particular religion if the employer is an educational institution that is, in whole or substantial part,
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or religious organization). For
a discussion of similar state statutory exemptions, see IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTELE,
ROUNDTABLE ON PROVIDERS: THE STATE OF THE LAW app. B (2002).
13 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
14 See id at 5 n.4.
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and a "colored" woman whose out-of-state marriage subjected them to
criminal prosecution in Virginia. 15
The Court observed that "[t]here can be no question but that
Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn
according to race."16 The Court noted that "[o]ver the years, this Court
has consistently repudiated '[d]istinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people whose
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.'"" 7 At the very
least, the Equal Protection Clause requires that racial classifications by
government be proven necessary to achieve some legitimate, overriding
government purpose-a purpose, the Court noted, of which it was
difficult to conceive in this case.18
A religious justification for Virginia's statute lurked in Loving,
although it was not expressly cited by the Virginia Supreme Court in its
validation of the Act. 19 The trial judge, in sentencing the Lovings to
one year in jail (suspended for a period of twenty-five years, on
condition that they leave the State), wrote in his opinion that
"'Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay, and red,
and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference
with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages."' 20
The Supreme Court gave no analysis of this religious argument,
signaling, apparently, that it did not put much credence in it.
The question of religious entitlement to engage in race
discrimination was squarely addressed in Bob Jones University v.
United States,21 decided sixteen years later. At issue was an I.R.S.
policy (provoked by court decision) that private schools with racially
discriminatory policies did not qualify as tax-exempt organizations
under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.22 Bob Jones
University, an institution "giving special emphasis to the Christian
religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures," 23 prohibited
interracial dating and marriage. In particular, "[s]tudents who
[were] . . . partners in an interracial marriage" would be expelled;
15 See id. at 2-4.
16 Id at 11.
17 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100
(1943)).
18 See id. at 11-12.
19 The reasons given by the Virginia Supreme Court were those given in its decision in Naim
v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891 (1955), reinstated and
affd, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 985 (1956). They were: "to preserve the
racial integrity of its citizens," to prevent "the corruption of blood" and the development of "a
mongrel breed of citizens," and to preserve "racial pride." Id at 756.
20 Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
21 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
22 See id. at 577-80.
23 See id. at 580 (quoting Certificate of Incorporation of Bob Jones University, Inc., Joint
Appendix at 109, Bob Jones, 461 U.S. 574 (No. 81-3)).
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"[s]tudents who [were] . . . members of or affiliated with any group or
organization which. . . advocates interracial marriage" would be
expelled; and "[s]tudents who date[d] outside of their own race" would
be expelled. 24
The case was litigated under the peculiar posture of whether the
I.R.S. overstepped its bounds by ruling that racially discriminatory
schools were not "charitable" institutions because their activities were
contrary to "fundamental public policy." 25 In the course of discussing
this question, however, the Court made plain that "racial discrimination
in education violates a most fundamental national public policy, as well
as rights of individuals." 2 6
Few social or political issues in our history have been more
vigorously debated . .. than the issue of racial discrimination,
particularly in education. Given the stress and anguish of the history
of efforts to escape from the shackles of the "separate but equal"
doctrine ... , it cannot be said that educational institutions that, for
whatever reasons, practice racial discrimination, are institutions
exercising "beneficial and stabilizing influences in community
life" ..... Whatever may be the rationale for such private schools'
policies, and however sincere the rationale may be, racial
discrimination in education is contrary to public policy. 27
This holding, of course, did not specifically address the
constitutional question that Bob Jones University raised, which was
that, "even if the Commissioner's policy [were] ... valid as to
nonreligious private schools, that policy [could not] ... constitutionally
be applied to schools that engage in religious discrimination on the basis
of sincerely held religious beliefs." 28 To apply that policy to religious
schools, it argued, would "violate[] ... free exercise rights" under the
First Amendment to the Constitution.29
The Court also rejected this argument, on the basis that the
government interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education
was "compelling." 30  "That government interest," the Court wrote,
"substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places
on [such schools'] . . . exercise of their religious beliefs." 31
Bob Jones, because of its rather peculiar posture, does not
answer-by its own terms-all of the conceivable questions involved in
conflicts over claimed religious exemptions and anti-discrimination
24 See id. at 580-81.
25 See id at 592.
26 Id. at 593.
27 Id at 595 (emphasis added) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)).
28 Id. at 602.
29 Id. at 603.
30 See id. at 604.
31 Id
2074 [Vol. 32:5
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laws. However, post-Bob Jones, no federal or state court has expressed
the view that religious reasons exempt otherwise prohibited actions
from race anti-discrimination laws. Indeed, it is safe to say that the idea
that race discrimination-otherwise prohibited by law-could be
justified on religious grounds is not a claim that any contemporary court
or other lawmaking body would seriously consider. It is, in a word, too
odious to be entertained.
II. OTHER TRADITIONALLY ODIOUS DISCRIMINATION
Other traditionally prohibited forms of discrimination that are
odious in nature include discrimination on the basis of color, national
origin, religion, and sex. Because the considerations involved differ,
these will be discussed separately.
A. Color and National Origin
Discrimination on the basis of color or national origin is clearly
odious. Both involve discrimination on the basis of immutable
individual characteristics, and discrimination on the basis of either has
been declared "unfair, unjust, and inconsistent with the public policy of
the United States as manifested in its Constitution and laws" by the
Supreme Court.32 Because of their odious nature, any claim of right to
engage in color or national-origin discrimination-whether by public or
private actors-is highly suspect. Although discrimination on the basis
of national origin might be permissible in certain instances, such as
when it is pursued as a bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq) in
employment, 33 such exemptions must be factually based and are
generally treated as extremely narrow exceptions to the general
prohibition of national-origin discrimination. 34 General claims of right
to engage in discrimination on the basis of color or national origin are
not tolerated. This would include a claimed religious imperative to
engage in such discrimination.
32 Id. at 594-95 (quoting Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 652 (1959-1963)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
33 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).
34 See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (Title VII's bfoq exception).
2011] 2075
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B. Religion
Constitutional and statutory prohibitions against discrimination on
the basis of religion are more complex, but in the end, this form of
individual status or identity discrimination is odious as well.
Discrimination on the basis of religion or "creed" is a recognized
part of the odious discriminatory quadumvirate. As stated in Bob Jones,
discrimination on the basis "of. . . race, color, creed, or national origin"
has long been condemned as contrary to fundamental principles of
equality in American law. 35 Although discrimination on the basis of
religion might be permitted in certain circumstances, such as when it is
a part of a bona fide occupational qualification, 36 such exemptions are
narrow, factually driven exceptions to the general prohibition. 37
Creed is arguably different from the others on this list because it is
not an "innate" characteristic; creed is, instead, something that an
individual is assumed to have voluntarily chosen. However, the strong
tradition of the need for protection of freedom of conscience in
American law, and the strong tradition of belief in the importance of
religion in individual lives, have led to a legal presumption that
individuals' religious choices are compelled, final for legal purposes,
and virtually unquestionable. 38
The question, therefore, is whether an individual religious
exemption can justify an individual's engaging in religious
discrimination. Under prevailing legal norms, can an individual claim
that her Protestant Christian religious beliefs justify her refusal to
employ a Catholic, or rent to a Jain? Is this odious discrimination of the
kind reflected in race, color, and national origin discrimination?
Religious is different from the forms of odious discrimination
considered above, in that it potentially has both identity and conduct
components. It can involve: (1) discrimination that is based solely on
an individual's religious affiliation or identity (i.e., a refusal to hire an
individual because she is a Jew, without more); or (2) discrimination
that is rooted in conduct, which is derivative of an individual's religious
affiliation or beliefs (i.e., refusal to hire someone who manifests
particular attitudes or engages in particular practices that are the product
of religious beliefs). 39
35 Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 594-95.
36 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703(e)(1).
37 See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334.
38 See, e g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 609 (1961); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 86-87 (1944); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
39 For an extended discussion of this distinction in the context of employment discrimination
law, see Underkuffler, supra note 10, at 610-25.
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At times, it might seem difficult to distinguish between these cases
because the kind of discrimination represented by the first type
("identity discrimination") is often bound up with certain stereotypical
or assumed claims about the beliefs and conduct in which particular
religious groups engage and, thus, is "conduct-based" to that extent.
However, the core distinction is clear. In discrimination of the first
kind, which is odious discrimination as I have used that term, an
individual is the subject of discrimination solely because of his religious
affiliation or identity; there is nothing objectionable about his conduct,
if done by someone else. 40 In the cases of the second kind, it is the
conduct itself that is objectionable, or illegal; it would (arguably) be
objectionable or illegal no matter what the identity of the person who
engages in it is. The fact that the conduct is the product of religious
beliefs might be relevant in some contexts, 41 but it is not relevant here.
If the discrimination is truly rooted in the individual's conduct, and not
in religious affiliation or identity, then it is not odious discrimination in
the way that term is understood here.
If odious religious discrimination is involved, it follows that a
claimed religious exemption should not-and indeed under current law
does not-justify engagement in that discrimination. As discussed
above, discrimination on the basis of religious creed is as condemned as
that based on race, color, or national origin. The idea that
discrimination on the basis of religious creed is contrary to fundamental
tenets of American justice was born in the historical record of religious
oppression and persecution that existed in virtually all of the American
colonies. 42 In Virginia, for instance, Quakers were banished from the
state and subjected to the penalty of death upon their third return.43 In
the Virginia counties of Orange, Spotsylvania, and Culpepper, Baptist
preachers were persecuted, beaten, and imprisoned. 44  Puritan
Massachusetts also banished Quakers from the colony on pain of death.
When four Quaker women returned, in violation of the law, they were
burned at the stake. 45 Citizenship and eligibility to hold public office
were restricted by law to Protestant Christians throughout New
England, most mid-Atlantic colonies, and the South.46  Today, a
40 See, e.g., State v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. 1985),
dismissed for lack of juris., 478 U.S. 1015 (1986) (involving claim that employer failed to
promote individuals who were not "born-again Christians" into management positions); Lucido v.
Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 125-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (involving claim that
lawyer was not offered partnership, in part, because of his Catholic religious identity).
41 For instance, if conduct is the claimed product of religious beliefs that might be relevant to
that individual's claim for protection under constitutional or statutory free exercise principles.
42 See Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 4, at 879-91 (discussing the historical record).
43 See id. at 881.
44 See id at 882.
45 See id. at 883.
46 See id. at 883-87.
2011] 2077
HeinOnline  -- 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 2077 2010-2011
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
claimed right to engage in religious affiliation-or identity-
discrimination, on the ground that this discrimination is "compelled" by
the individual holder's religious beliefs, would (at best) have to
overcome the strongest possible presumption against this form of odious
discrimination.
C. Sex
Discrimination on the basis of gender or sex is widely prohibited
by federal and state civil rights laws. 47  The eradication of sex
discrimination in employment, housing, educational opportunity, and
other settings is an established national policy. For instance, by
enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress "clearly
targeted the elimination of all forms of discrimination"-including sex
discrimination-as a "highest [national] priority."48 Hundreds of cases
alleging sex discrimination are brought annually in the nation's courts,
and all levels of government take them seriously. Any claim of a right
to impose different treatment of men and women is subject to rigorous
judicial scrutiny and must be proven to be grounded in the legitimate,
verifiable requirements of a particular employment, educational, or
other setting. 49 The old idea that an individual's gender presumptively
justifies different treatment in wages, working conditions, the
availability of housing, and other private or government services is no
longer credible. Discrimination on the basis of sex is a well established
category of odious discrimination.
The reason for the law's recognition of the odious nature of gender
discrimination is not difficult to discern. A person's gender is an
immutable human characteristic. A person no more chooses the sexual
anatomy with which he was born than a person chooses his race or
national origin. As such, it is "unfair" and "unjust"50 for an individual's
47 For instance, section 704 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 lists five "forbidden
criteria" for use in employment: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin. See 110 CONG.
REC. 7213 (1964), reprinted in EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE VII AND XI OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3042-43 (1968) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. in all of
these categories, its goal was "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications." Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 425, 431 (1971) (involving sex discrimination claim). The purpose of the Act, as
articulated on the Senate floor, was to "eliminate all obstacles to equal opportunity." 110 CONG.
REC. 12,619 (1964), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra.
48 EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (citing S. REP. NO. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 11, 24 (1964)); see also
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
49 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. V1l, § 703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (2006)
(setting forth the requirements of a bona fide occupational qualification).
50 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1983).
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treatment to be different on this ground. A century ago, women were
denied the right to vote and faced legally entrenched discrimination in
all aspects of social and governmental life. Just as the nation has
struggled "to escape from the shackles of the 'separate but equal
doctrine"' in the case of race, 51 so it has struggled to escape from the
culturally and legally entrenched belief that women are inferior to men
and that their legal treatment should reflect that truth.
Can gender discrimination be excused if the defendant claims
religiously compelled bias? Can an employer pay a woman less than a
man because he claims compulsion by a religious text, or a civil
government employee refuse to serve a woman because his religion (on
gender-based grounds) forbids it? There has been copious litigation on
these questions over the years, and the answer is no. Unless the actor is
a religious organization, which is entitled to special exemptions across
the board,5 2 no recognized authority holds that there is a personal,
religious exemption for religiously motivated gender discrimination.
Just as the norm of equality is too important to permit racial
discrimination "for whatever reasons" (including religious reasons), 53
so the norm of equality is too important to permit the broad,
theoretically different treatment of the nation's men and women.
III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND TRANSGENDER STATUS
A. Sexual Orientation
In the last twenty-five years, there has been a sea change in legal
recognition of sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for
discrimination. Currently, almost half of the states and the District of
Columbia have laws prohibiting sexual-orientation discrimination in
public and private sector employment. 54 Many of these statutes also
prohibit discrimination in public accommodations, housing, and
credit.55 In addition, more than 100 cities in thirty states have enacted
some form of civil rights legislation that prohibits sexual-orientation
discrimination. 56
51 See id at 595.
52 See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
53 See Bob Jones, 461 U.S. at 595.
54 Sexual Orientation Discrimination: Your Rights, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/article-29541 .html (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
55 Sexual Discrimination and Orientation, USLEGAL L. DIG., http://lawdigest.uslegal.com/
civil-rights/sexual-discrimination-and-orientation/7177 (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
56 These cities include Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, Miami, New York, Pittsburgh, St. Louis,
and Seattle. Some courts have also recognized nondiscrimination rights under a sex stereotyping
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The most remarkable shift has occurred in the elimination of
discrimination against gay men and lesbian women in the nation's
marriage laws. In 2003, Massachusetts became the first state to legalize
same-sex marriage by judicial decree.57  In the last two years,
California, Connecticut, and Iowa followed.58 Legislatures in Maine,
Vermont, New Hampshire, and the District of Columbia passed same-
sex marriage legislation of their own initiative. 59 The idea of the
legality of same-sex marriage anywhere in the United States would have
been unthinkable just ten years ago. 60
These legal developments are the result of changing attitudes
toward sexual orientation and its immutability in the United States. In a
Quinnipiac University poll taken in 2009, only 36% of respondents
believed that being gay or lesbian was a voluntary choice. 61
Concomitant with this change have been changes in attitudes toward
discrimination against gay men and lesbian women in all spheres of life.
For instance, in a Gallup poll taken in 1977, 56% of respondents
believed that homosexuals should have equal rights in employment; by
2008, this number had increased to 89%.62 In a recent Newsweek poll,
87% of respondents believed that there should be equal rights for gays
and lesbians in terms of job opportunities; 82% believed that there
should be equal rights in terms of housing; and 73% believed that there
should be equal rights in terms of health insurance and other employee
theory brought as sex discrimination under other civil rights laws. See, e.g., Rene v. MGM Grand
Hotel, Inc., 243 F.3d 1206 (9th Cir. 2002) (construing Title VII).
57 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
58 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 385 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health,
957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). Subsequently, the
California State Constitution was amended by referendum to prohibit same-sex marriage. That
amendment was declared invalid by a federal district court in August, 2010; litigation is ongoing.
See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010), stay pending appeal, 2010
WL 3212786 (9th Cir. 2010). Neither the Governor of California nor the State's Attorney
General has appeared to defend the amendment in court; this has been left to advocacy groups.
59 See An Act to End Discrimination in Civil Marriage and Affirm Religious Freedom, S.P.
384, L.D. 1020, 124th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Me. 2009); An Act Affirming Religious Protections
with Regard to Marriage and Prohibiting the Establishment of Civil Unions, H.B. 73, H.B. 310,
H.B. 435, 2009-2010 Leg. Sess. (N.H. 2009); An Act to Protect Religious Freedom and
Recognize Equality in Civil Marriage, S. 115, 2009-20 10 Leg. Sess. (Vt. 2009).
In November, 2009, voters repealed the Maine legislation through referendum. See Lupu
& Tuttle, supra note 3, at 274 n.L The religious freedom to which these laws refer is that of
clergy members and religious groups. See id at 283 (discussing statutes).
60 In the last few years, same-sex marriage has also been legally available in Belgium,
Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Spain, and Sweden. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra
note 3, at 276 n.12.
61 Quinnipiac University Poll (Apr. 21-27, 2009), http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm.
62 Frank Newport, American Attitudes Toward Homosexuality Continue to Become More
Tolerant, GALLUP (Jan. 4, 2001), http://www.gallup.com/poll/4432/american-attitudes-toward-
homosexuality-continue-become-more-tolerant.aspx; Gallup Poll (May 8-11, 2008),
http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm.
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benefits. 63 On December 22, 2010, President Obama signed historic
legislation that allows gay men and lesbian women to serve openly in
the military forces of the United States. 64
On the historically most divisive issue of same-sex marriage, a
recent poll commissioned by CNN found that 52% of respondents
believed that "gays and lesbians should have a constitutional right to get
married and have their marriage recognized as valid by law." 65 This
was the first time in American polling history that a majority supported
that idea-an increase of 30% in just six years. 66 If the choice is
presented as same-sex marriage or civil unions, polled support is
overwhelming. In a poll taken this year, 70% of respondents believed
that gay couples should be afforded protection of one kind or another.67
Only 25% responded that there should be "no recognition" of a gay
couple's relationship. 68
Changes in attitudes toward gay men and lesbian women have
been driven, in part, by new awareness of the history of their
persecution in the United States. In our history, gay men and lesbian
women have been "condemned to death by choking, burning, and
drowning; .. . executed, jailed, pilloried, fined, court-martialed,
prostituted, fired, framed, blackmailed, disinherited, . . . declared
insane, driven to insanity, to suicide, murder, and self-hate, witch-
hunted, entrapped, stereotyped, mocked, insulted, isolated,
... castigated, . . . [and] despised," because of who they are. 69
"Violence against gay[s] and lesbians . .. is a structural feature of life in
American society." 70
For those jurisdictions that prohibit discrimination against gay and
lesbian citizens, in some or all of its forms, that prohibition is rooted in
the recognition that sexual-orientation discrimination-like that based
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin-is odious
discrimination. With acknowledgment that one's sexual orientation is
63 Newsweek Poll (Dec. 3-4, 2008), http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm.
6 Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Away "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/us/politics/23military.html.
65 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll (Aug. 6-10, 2010),
http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm; cf Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or False Alarm: Why
Proposed Exemptions to Equal Marriage Statutes Return Us to a Religious Understanding of the
Public Marketplace, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 236, 242 (2010) ("majority opposition to equal
marriage is the nationwide norm").
66 Time/CNN Poll (Feb. 5-6, 2004), http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm.
67 CBS News Poll (Aug. 20-24, 2010), http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm.
68 Id
69 JONATHAN KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY MEN IN THE U.S.A. 11
(1976), quoted in Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1464
(1992).
70 Thomas, supra note 69, at 1464.
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not a choice, 71 discrimination on the basis of that characteristic is not on
the basis of what one does, but on who one is. Conduct may be a part of
gay or lesbian sexual orientation, but that conduct is simply an
expression of who that person is. As Richard Mohr observed, the
conduct in which gay men and lesbian women are imagined to engage is
a "sign[] or marker[] for a despised status . . . . It is their mere
existence, mere presence, that offends." 72 Mohr elaborated:
Such acts as gays are thought to perform-whether sexual, gestural,
or social-are viewed . .. as the expected or even necessary
efflorescence of gays' lesser moral state, of their status as lesser
beings .... Such purported acts-the stuff of stereotypes-provide
the materials for a retrospectively constructed ideology concocted to
justify the group's despised status, just as, for instance, the beliefs
that Jews poison wells and kill babies and Messiahs are concocted, as
socially "needed," to justify society's hatred of Jews. Hatred's
targeting of status is primitive, and its condemnation of behavior an
ideologically inspired afterthought.73
Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation-like
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin-is
discrimination that is based on personal, biological status; where it is
forbidden by law, it is forbidden for that reason.74
With protections for gay men and lesbian women from
discrimination, the question arises whether religious exemptions to such
laws should be permitted. This question has led to an increasingly
heated debate in the scholarly literature in the past few years, with the
vast majority of writers assuming that religious exemptions of various
sorts should be permitted.75 Commentators have almost universally
approached this question from the point of view that the relative
71 See Quinnipiac Univ. Poll, supra note 61; Poll Majority: Gays' Orientation Can't Change,
CNN (June 26, 2007), http://articles.cnn.com/2007-06-27/US/poll.gay lopinion-research-
corporation-poll-latest-poll-sampling-error?_s=PM:US (reporting that 56% of respondents stated
that they believed that individuals cannot change their sexual orientation, even if they wished to
so do).
72 RICHARD MOHR, A MORE PERFECT UNION: WHY STRAIGHT AMERICA MUST STAND UP
FOR GAY RIGHTS 65-66 (1994), quoted in Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious
Intent, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 89, 127 (1997).
73 Id. at 65-66.
74 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 385, 442 (Cal. 2008) ("[B]ecause a person's
sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one's identity, it is not appropriate to require a person
to repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.");
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 893 (Iowa 2009) (stating that sexual orientation "may be
altered [if at all] only at the expense of significant damage to the individual's sense of self")
(quoting Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 438-39 (Conn. 2008)); cf Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (holding that an amendment to the Colorado Constitution, which
prohibited all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state government that
explicitly protected gays or lesbians, "identifie[d] persons by a single trait," had no legitimate
purpose, and violated the principle of equal protection of the laws).
75 See discussion infra note 89.
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burdens upon gay or lesbian individuals (if the exemption is granted)
and upon the religious adherent (if the exemption is denied) should be
determinative of the outcome. It is my contention, as explained below,
that this approach is peculiar, that it is applied in no other case of odious
discrimination, and that it is just as inappropriate in this case as it is in
others.
First, let us consider the question of religious exemptions to permit
engagement in employment, housing, commercial service, credit, or
other accommodations discrimination. To date, few such cases have
surfaced in the courts. In Walden v. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention,76 an employee of a federal contractor, who was hired to
provide counseling services to federal employees, refused to provide
same-sex relationship counseling on the ground that it conflicted with
her religious beliefs. After her termination, she claimed that her
religious beliefs were entitled to protection under the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause as well as other authorities.77 The
Court ruled against her, finding that her religious beliefs were not, in
fact, the grounds for her termination. 78
One recent case that squarely addressed the issue is North Coast
Women's Care Medical Group v. Benitez,79 decided by the California
Supreme Court in 2008. In that case, a medical clinic's physicians
claimed religious exemptions to avoid compliance with California's
prohibition against sexual-orientation discrimination.80 In particular,
the two physicians refused to provide infertility treatment to a lesbian
woman, on the ground that it would contradict their religious beliefs.81
The Court began by quoting California's Unruh Civil Rights Act,
which states that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are
free and equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion,
ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition are entitled to
the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or
services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." 82 A
medical group providing medical services to the public had been
previously held to be a business establishment for purposes of the Act.83
76 Walden v. Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, No. 1:08-cv-02278-JEC (N.D. Ga.
2010).
77 See id at 12.
78 See id at 17.
79 N. Coast Women's Care Med. Grp. v. Benitez, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
80 See id. at 962.
81 Id. at 963-65.
82 See id at 965.
83 Id at 965; Leach v. Drummond Med. Grp., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 362, 369 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983).
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Furthermore, during the period in question, California's courts
interpreted the Act to prohibit sexual-orientation discrimination. 84
The physicians' claims for religious exemption were brought under
the United States Constitution and the California Constitution. The
Court rejected the federal claim on the ground that, under Smith, a
religious objector has no federal constitutional right to an exemption
from a neutral and generally applicable law.85 Regarding the state
constitutional claim, the Court noted that to date, the appropriate
standard of review for religious exemption claims had not been
determined. 86 "[H]owever," the Court wrote, "this case presents no
need for us to determine the appropriate test. For even under a strict
scrutiny standard, defendants' claim fails."87 This is because the Act
"furthers California's compelling interest in ensuring full and equal
access to medical treatment irrespective of sexual orientation, and there
are no less restrictive means for the state to achieve that goal."8 8
Few legislators or commentators today advance the idea that
commercial purveyors of goods and services can simply deny them to
gay men and lesbian women on religious grounds. The days when
simple abhorrence of homosexuality was believed to justify
discriminatory treatment seem to be over for mainstream commentators
and legal analysts. Religious exemptions are rarely claimed to justify
such discrimination, any more than they are claimed to justify
discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, national origin, color,
or other biological/identity categories.
Rather, the setting in which sexual orientation discrimination is
argued to be justified on religious grounds is same-sex marriage. In a
flurry of recent articles, several commentators, including those
otherwise very supportive of equal rights, have argued that religious
exemptions, to one degree or another, should be provided to individuals
who wish to discriminate against same-sex marriages, and/or same-sex
married individuals, in violation of actual or proposed same-sex
marriage laws.89
84 See Benitez, 189 P.3d at 965. In 2005, the California Legislature amended the Act to
explicitly prohibit sexual orientation discrimination. See id
85 See id at 965-68.
86 See id at 968.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have
in Common, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 206, 207-08 (2010); Maggie Gallagher, Why
Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage Wars, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 260 (2010);
Douglas W. Kmiec, Same-Sex Marriage and the Coming Antidiscrimination Campaigns Against
Religion, in SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 103, 109
(Douglas Laycock et. al. eds., 2008); Colleen Theresa Rutledge, Caught in the Crossfire: How
Catholic Charities of Boston Was Victim to the Clash Between Gay Rights and Religious
Freedom, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 297, 297-300, 305-09 (2008); Marc D. Stern, Liberty
v. Equality; Equality v. Liberty, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 307 (2010); Robin Fretwell Wilson,
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In those few jurisdictions in which marital discrimination or its
equivalent has been outlawed, and a religious exemption claim has
subsequently been made, courts and other tribunals have rejected the
religious claim. In New Mexico, a wedding photographer refused to
provide photography services for a same-sex wedding ceremony, and in
New Jersey, a Methodist organization that rented a pavilion to the
public refused to rent it to a same-sex couple for a civil-union
ceremony.90 (The latter case fell outside of the traditional civil-rights
exemptions for religious organizations because the organization
acknowledged that its rental activities were a purely commercial
enterprise. 91) In both cases, the claims for religious exemptions were
denied.92 In England, a Christian Justice of the Peace announced a
refusal to place children in adoptions by same sex couples, 93 and a
public marriage registrar of the Christian faith refused to register a
same-sex civil partnership as required by law. 94 In both cases, tribunals
refused to recognize the claimed religious exemptions. 95
Because of the newness of the question, however, claims to
religious exemption in this context are more a question of formulating
policy than one of debating the terms of existing law. Proponents of
exemptions vigorously claim that religious exemptions of various kinds
should be afforded to individuals who are otherwise engaged in the
provision of secular goods or services to members of the general public.
For instance, it has been argued that religious objectors should not be
required to provide services, accommodations, facilities, goods, or
privileges to same-sex couples in the preparation for or conduct of their
Insubstantial Burdens: The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage
Laws, 5 Nw. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 318 (2010). For an opposing view, see Chai R. Feldblum, Moral
Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 61, 63-64 (2006); Flynn,
supra note 65.
90 See Elane Photography v. Willock, No. D-202-cv-200806632 (N.M. 2d. Jud. Dist. Ct. Dec.
16, 2009); Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n, No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J. Dep't of
Law & Pub. Safety Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases08/
pr20081229a-Bemstein-v-OGCMA.pdf. Both cases receive extended treatment in Lupu &
Tuttle, supra note 3, at 275, 279-82.
91 See Bernstein, No. PN34XB-03008, at 7-9 ("[T]he uses and functions of the Boardwalk
Pavilion, rather than the nature of Respondent's organization, [must be] used to determine
whether the Boardwalk Pavilion is a public accommodation subject to the L[aw] A[gainst]
D[iscrimination].").
92 See Elane Photography, No. D-202-CV-200806632; Bernstein, No. PN34XB-03008, at 12
("[I]t goes without saying that the [Act's] . . . fundamental goal of eradicating discrimination is a
legitimate governmental interest.... Thus, any incidental burden on a particular religious belief
or practice does not raise free exercise concerns.").
93 See McClintock v. Dep't of Constitutional Affairs, [2008] IRLR 29 (EAT), available at
http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2007/0223 07 31 10.html.
94 London Borough Islington v. Ladele, No. UKEAT 0453/08/RN (Dec. 19, 2008).
95 Id. 52; McClintock, [2008] IRLR 29, 38.
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wedding ceremonies, or in broad aspects of their married lives
thereafter.96
These proposals, of course, are not needed for religious
organizations for their religious activities; those are already exempt, as
discussed above, as a matter of federal constitutional law.97 Rather,
these proposals are to allow a municipal clerk, employed in a city
clerk's office, to refuse to issue a marriage license to a same-sex couple;
to allow a hotel owner to refuse to let a room to a same-sex couple; to
allow a counselor or physician to refuse to treat a same-sex couple; and
so on. Some of these proposals attempt to ameliorate the result by
adding that the exemption will not apply if the same-sex individual or
couple "is unable to obtain any similar services, accommodations,
advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges elsewhere." 98
One characteristic of these proposals is striking. Although stated
by their proponents to be targeting the same-sex couple, they are not
limited, by their terms, to that class. 99 Rather, they grant exemptions to
the religious individual who discriminates against any marriage or
marital partner on otherwise prohibited grounds.100  Under various
forms of these proposals, presumably, a marriage registrar could refuse
to issue a license to an interracial couple on the basis of their race; a
hotel owner or landlord could refuse to let a room to an interfaith,
Jewish or Catholic couple because of their religion; or a doctor could
refuse to provide medical or counseling services to an individual or
couple on the basis of a marital partner's national origin.
Proponents assure us that this is not what is intended; that it is only
same-sex individuals and couples who are the intended targets of this
proposed legislation. 01 Presumably the veneer of neutrality in these
proposals is necessary to avoid the awkwardness (and probable
unconstitutionality) of explicitly singling out a particular, disadvantaged
group. In Romer v. Evans, for instance, the Supreme Court struck down
a state constitutional amendment that deprived gay and lesbian
citizens-but no others-of the protections of anti-discrimination
96 See, e.g., Stern, supra note 91, at 307 (proposing, with other scholars, the following
statutory language: "No individual ... shall be liable, penalized, or denied benefits under the laws
of this state .. . including but not limited to laws regarding employment discrimination, housing,
public accommodations, licensing, government contracts or grants, or tax-exempt status, for
refusing to provide services, accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, or privileges related
to the solemnization of any marriage, for refusing to solemnize any marriage, or for refusing to
treat as valid any marriage, if such providing, solemnizing, or treating as valid would cause such
individuals . . . to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs . . .
97 See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
98 See Stern, supra note 89, at 307-08.
99 See, e.g., id at 307.
100 See Flynn, supra note 65, at 237-39, 244-45 (analyzing this characteristic).
101 See, e.g., Stern, supra note 89, at 307 ("Our suggestion for a statute appl[ies] to all
marriages, but in practical terms [is] relevant only to same-sex marriages .... ).
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legislation. The Court held that the state could not, with no articulated
and legitimate reason, single out-for legal disabilities-a particular,
trait-based group. 102
Whether the wink-and-nod "textual neutrality" of these proposals
will defeat the application of Romer and salvage their constitutionality
is an open question. Either way, however, the proposals' ostensible
treatment of (religious) discrimination against gay men and lesbian
women as "on a par" with the legal treatment of (religious)
discrimination against other groups raises a different, and important,
question. Why should religiously grounded discrimination be tolerated
against gay and lesbian citizens when, regarding racial, religious,
gender, national-origin, and other groups, it is not? It is certainly not
that homosexuals are less needing of protection, or that their struggle
against prejudice and gratuitous violence throughout American history
has been any less tragic than that experienced by Jews, Catholics,
women, the Irish, or other groups. There must, in short, be a reason
why elimination of trait- or identity-based discrimination-so odious in
these other cases-is not so odious in this.
When one examines the religious exemption proponents' answers
to this question, nothing substantial is found. For instance, it has been
argued that "race is different" because it is the only wrong that was part
of an American civil war. 03 However, even that scholar acknowledges
that "[tihere has . .. been bigotry against gays and lesbians similar to
the racism and oppression of African-Americans."l 04 In addition, and
perhaps more to the point, exemption proponents single out sexual
orientation as the one trait or status that should be trumped by religious
claims. What about sex, religion, or national origin, for instance? None
of those were the subject of civil wars. Why is sexual orientation
discrimination not akin to these?
For the most part, religious exemption proponents do not attempt
to explain these anomalies. Rather, they focus on the stress that the
religious objector endures when forced to treat the marriages and
subsequent lives of gay men and lesbian women with acceptance or
respect. For instance, it has been stated that:
Denials of service do affect gay couples by causing them
disturbance, hurt, and offense. While acknowledging that harm, one
must acknowledge . .. that the harm to the objector from legal
sanctions is greater and more concrete. . . . One simply has not given
the religious dissenter's interest significant weight if one finds that
102 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); see also Koppelman, supra note 72, at 134 ("A
classification should be suspect ... if many citizens think that the classification in question
distinguishes persons who are entitled to a full measure of concern and respect from persons who
are inherently degraded and inferior. Sexual orientation is a classification of this sort.").
103 See Berg, supra note 89, at 235.
104 Id. at 234.
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offense or disturbance from messages of disapproval are sufficient to
override it.105
Or, it has been observed that religious objectors to same-sex marriage
laws "will . . . face a Hobson's choice between facilitating same-sex
marriages against their conscience[s]"l 06 and giving up their businesses
or jobs as municipal marriage registrars. 107
What these arguments miss is that religious objectors' interests are
always impaired when they claim a right to engage in identity-based,
odious discrimination that the law prohibits. In our history, religious
claims were made about the right to discriminate against women, the
right to discriminate against blacks, the right to discriminate against
Catholics and Jews, and the right to discriminate against every foreign
group that was, at the moment, the object of prejudice. The mere fact
that the religious objector loses to the state norm has never justified the
norm's abandonment. Religious objectors to interfaith or interracial
marriage might "face a Hobson's choice between facilitating [the
interfaith or interracial] marriages against their consciences," but that
has never meant that they can-for that reason-refuse to do it.
The point that religious exemption proponents miss is that odious
discrimination recognized by law is, ipso facto, odious discrimination
recognized by law. Discrimination on the basis of such immutable
individual characteristics is "unfair, unjust, and inconsistent" with the
public policy that the law declares.108 In those jurisdictions where the
unfairness of sexual-orientation discrimination has been recognized by
law, this principle is as true as it is in any other context. Laws that
prohibit discrimination against gay men and lesbian women, in all
aspects of their lives, attempt to "foster[] . . . individual dignity,
... creat[e] ... a climate and environment in which each individual can
utilize his or her potential. . . , and [ensure] equal protection" of the
laws. 109 As in all other areas of legally proscribed, odious
discrimination, there is no convincing reason for tolerance of religiously
motivated discrimination in this context.
105 Id. at 229.
106 Id at 207.
107 See id at 228-32; Wilson, supra note 89, at 323-26.
108 See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 594-95 (1983).
109 Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 37
(D.C. 1978).
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B. Transgender Status
The issue of discrimination on the basis of transgender status"i0 is
the subject of a rapidly evolving field. Traditionally, courts refused to
interpret protections against sex discrimination in civil rights laws to
include discrimination against transgendered people. " However, more
recently, courts have held that transgendered people who are subject to
harassment, ridicule, or adverse employment action by virtue of their
transgender status might be protected under sex-discrimination
prohibitions or other provisions of civil-rights laws. For instance, in
Smith v. City of Salem, a federal circuit court held that a transsexual
person who was targeted for failure to conform to expected gender
norms had a claim for sex discrimination under Title VII of the federal
Civil Rights Act of 1964.112 Similarly, in Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry,
Inc., a New York court held that a hostile work environment created by
derogatory comments about an employee's sex reassignment surgery
was discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the New York City
Administrative Code.' '1
Beginning in 1975, state and municipal governments have adopted
civil-rights laws that expressly protect transgendered people. Currently,
thirteen states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that
prohibit discrimination in public employment on the basis of gender
identity or expression, as do about 109 cities and counties. 114 Executive
Orders prohibiting discrimination in public employment on the basis of
gender identity or expression have been issued in Indiana, Ohio,
110 Transgender status is termed "Gender Identity Disorder" by the American Psychiatric
Association. It describes a disjunction between an individual's sexual organs and sexual identity.
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
576-82 (4th ed. 2000).
Ill See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Title VII does
not protect transsexuals"); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 661 (9th Cir.
1977) (ruling that the district court correctly held that Title VII "does not embrace transsexual
discrimination"). These courts apparently acted on the belief that transsexualism is voluntary,
and that discrimination against transgendered persons is, for that and other reasons, "of a different
and permissible sort." Sunish Gulati, The Use of Gender-Loaded Identities in Sex-Stereotyping
Jurisprudence, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2177, 2187 (2003). Another judicial theory has been that "it is
permissible to discriminate against transsexuals as long as one discriminates against all
transsexuals." Melinda Chow, Smith v. City of Salem: Transgendered Jurisprudence and an
Expanding Meaning of Sex Discrimination Under Title VII, 28 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 207, 211
(2005).
112 See Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2004).
113 See Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
114 See Non-Discrimination Laws that Include Gender Identity and Expression,
TRANSGENDER L. & POL'Y INST., http://www.transgenderlaw.org/ndlaws/index.htm (last visited
Apr. 19, 2011). The states are Minnesota, Rhode Island, New Mexico, California, Maine,
Illinois, Hawaii, Washington, New Jersey, Vermont, Oregon, Iowa, and Colorado.
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Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania.'15 Hate crimes based on
gender identity are punishable by federal law,"l 6 as well as by many
state and local jurisdictions. In a poll taken in 2007, 68% of
respondents believed that federal hate crime laws should be expanded to
include the victim's gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity.17
In those jurisdictions where protections exist, those protections are
an effort to eliminate odious discrimination. Transgender status is a
fundamental aspect of an individual's identity, with deep psychological
and physical roots. A decision to prohibit this form of discrimination is
a decision to prohibit discrimination on the basis of identity and
immutable, biological characteristics.
Claims for religious exemptions from protections for transgendered
people have apparently not yet arisen. They could arise in the general
context of enforcement of anti-discrimination laws or, more likely, in
the marriage context. Just as there has been no tolerance for religiously
grounded discrimination against persons by reason of their gender, race,
or national origin, there should be no tolerance for discrimination by
reason of the fact that the sexual anatomy with which a person was born
does not match his gender identity. Odious discrimination is, in the end,
odious discrimination.
CONCLUSION
Religious free exercise is important. It is important to individuals,
and to the society of which it is a part. I have dedicated a large part of
my life as a scholar to defending the special value of religion and
supporting its protection when it conflicts with secular government in
many areas of public life.
However, odious discrimination is different. Gratuitous
discrimination-on the basis of an individual's identity, biology, or
other immutable characteristic-has been labeled odious by our laws
and is intolerable as a part of public and commercial life. Just as a
claimed religious belief does not justify murder, theft, or tortious
conduct, so it does not justify odious discrimination against individuals
because of their identity or other immutable characteristics, when
prohibited by law. This fundamental principle is taken for granted by
115 Mich. Exec. Order No. 2008-22 (Dec. 18, 2008), available at http://www.michigan.gov/
documents/ose/ExecutiveOrder2008-22_269955_7.pdf; Non-Discrimination Laws, supra note
114.
116 Sexual orientation and gender identity were added to the list of federal hate crimes in 2009.
See Obama Signs Hate Crimes Bill into Law, CNN (Oct. 28, 2009), http:articles.cnn.com/2009-
10-28/politics/hate.crimes_1 crimes-gay-rights-human-rights-campaign?_s-pm:POLITICS.
117 Gallup Poll (May 10-13, 2007), http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm.
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all citizens. Indeed, a religious adherent who objects to rights for
homosexual men and women would undoubtedly be incredulous if it
were suggested that he could be subjected to discriminatory treatment,
on the basis of the religious beliefs of others, in public and commercial
life. No one-including this objector-would think it acceptable for a
religious municipal clerk to refuse to issue a marriage license because
the applicants are Baptist, or for a hotel owner to refuse to let a room
because the customer is-or is married to-a Jew.
The true question, thus, is not whether religious objectors should
be permitted to engage in odious discrimination, but whether
protections against odious discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation or transgender status will be singled out for exemptions that
no other civil rights permit.
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